By Anthony J. Scotti
Mr. Schleyer knew he was a target. He wrote a memo stating if he was kidnapped he did not want
anyone to negotiate his release. On September 5, 1977, Schleyer's car was in front. A follow
car with bodyguards was in the rear. As they approached the street where the ambush was to
take place, a lookout waved to his accomplice (10 seconds). Schleyer's cars turned into the
street. A van with three people in it was parked on the corner. A car drove toward them going
the wrong way on a one-way street (20 seconds). It cut in front of them, at the same time a
woman rolled a baby carriage in front of the car (30 seconds). Schleyer's car hit the
approaching car. The bodyguard's car hit Schleyer's car. One terrorist leaped from the
blocking car, opened the doors of Schleyer's car (the doors were unlocked), and killed the
bodyguards (40 seconds). The three men from the van opened fire, killing all the bodyguards
in the backup car. Total elapsed time: 100 seconds.
The morning of March 16, 1978. Two cars, both Fiat 130s. Moro was in the lead car, accompanied
by a driver and a bodyguard. Following in a separate car were three bodyguards. As they
approached an intersection with a stop sign, a small white car pulled up in front of them and
the driver jammed on the brakes (10 seconds). Moro's car hit the small white car, which had
just passed them, and the security car hit Moro's car. Two men jumped from the white car that
had just been hit (15 seconds), looking as though they were about to view the damage to their
car. When they approached Moro's car, they fired into the car, killing the driver and the
bodyguard. Meanwhile, four men dressed in Alitalia Airline uniforms machine gunned the
bodyguards in the following car (20 seconds). They took Moro and put him into a waiting car
and drove away. Total elapsed time: 45 seconds.
Threats of terrorism and kidnapping pose serious problems involving all aspects of security
management. Effective management dictates that available resources be used wisely and
concentrated on security weak points. One does not need to be a student of terrorism to
realize that assassinations or kidnappings take place where the protection to the victim is
most difficult. These acts take place where the risks are relatively low for the terrorist
and the possibility for success is relatively high. Although there is a considerable amount
of technology developed that offers impregnable protection at the home and place of business,
this protection is breached � twice a day � when traveling to and from the home. Over 85
percent of all kidnappings and assassinations occur while the victim is in transit.
During this period of time the risk to the attacker is minimal; the vulnerability of the
victim is at its maximum. This chapter focuses on this most dangerous period of time.
Transportation security became a serious problem when, in the late 1960s, guerrillas in
Latin America and elsewhere shifted their offenses from the countryside to the city, where
they could be assured of wide and efficient media coverage for their cause, however small
the organization. Ambushes took place in city streets rather than in a remote jungle.
When we consider, for instance, that more than 90 percent of all our personal travel is by
car, we can understand why many security experts point to transportation as the weak link
in the security chain. Several studies have shown that most kidnappings have occurred while
the victim was traveling by car.
Vehicles are easy to identify and observe. There are many components on a car that make it
easy to distinguish one car from another (license plates, color, body, make). A car is one
of the few places where a person can be alone or at least dependent on a fixed number of
security personnel, making it possible for the terrorist group to accurately estimate
defenses and adjust its manpower accordingly.
Ironically, when we are in a vehicle we feel safe; actually the opposite is true. Vehicles
can be easily followed and practice runs of potential ambushes are possible. Automobiles
appear to be solid and to, offer a great amount of protection because of the steel and safety
glass. Although there is some protection, it is minimal � a .22 long rifle can penetrate the
car door of a standard American sedan.
Traveling by car near the home, in the morning, is the most dangerous area and time for the
VIP because one of the necessary ingredients in a successful ambush is fixing a time and a
location. This task becomes increasingly easier near the VIP's home because of the following
1. Most VIPs believe in promptness � especially in the morning.
2. In the area of the home it is difficult, if not impossible, to change routes.
3. About 90 percent of morning travel is by car.
4. We feel secure and confident in a car.
5. Cars are easy to identify.
No wonder that 95 percent of all kidnappings occur near the home. Throughout the world
businessmen are becoming targets of kidnappings. Businessmen are chosen because they are
believed to be wealthy, powerful and influential, representative of something important, or
particularly valuable to someone. Whether a businessman truly fits into one of these
categories makes no difference. As long as the terrorist or criminal thinks he does � that's
all that counts!
A number of steps can be taken to minimize the danger of transit by vehicle. They can be
1. Countermeasures (e.g., procedures, awareness, route planning, countersurveillance).
2. The automobile (e.g., armoring cars, tire protection, communications).
3. Defensive and offensive driving.
Since the third of these essential elements can only be acquired from actual "hands on"
instruction and practice, this chapter discusses only the first two: preventive measures to
reduce the possibilities of attack and modifications to automobiles so that they both better
protect their occupants and better withstand terrorist assault.
Surprise is an essential element to any successful kidnapping. This one element is the key to
all the others. In order for a successful ambush to occur, the victim must be totally unaware
of what is about to happen. Therefore, it is logical that reducing the element of surprise is
of the utmost importance. How can a potential victim protect against surprise? Planning and
surprise are inseparable. Analysis of the tactics of surprise points to a definite pattern.
This pattern indicates that a successful ambush takes time to develop and actually occurs in
stages. This is not to say that every ambush happens in this manner; but it is logical to
assume that to use the element of surprise effectively requires planning, and from this
planning comes two steps:
1. Target selection. In the preliminary stages, usually more than one target is selected.
Terrorists are not interested in an individual personally � they are interested in what he
represents. They will, through meticulous surveillance, gather information about his lifestyle.
Once the information is gathered, they will focus on the individual who is the most vulnerable.
The Moro kidnapping appears to be a classic illustration of target selection. There is enough
evidence to suggest that the Red Brigades had originally selected Berlinguer, the Communist
Party leader of Italy, but he was a much harder target and Moro much easier.
2. Surveillance. The group may employ surveillance on more than one person. Surveillance
will take weeks, maybe months. The victim's movements will be analyzed and patterns of habit
established. In some cases photographs are taken. Surveillance will continue until the group
can predict, with reasonable accuracy, where a person is and when he is going to be there.
Therefore it is necessary to develop a before-the-fact awareness program that will eliminate
the element of surprise.
Planning is the essence of surprise and surveillance is the essence of a successful ambush.
Surveillance is needed to acquire the necessary information for a successful plan. Therefore,
developing a surveillance awareness program around the driving time period is essential.
Changing the time of departure plus the driving route is a necessity. But unfortunately, in
many cases, especially in the morning, it is impossible to vary time schedules by any great
amount. Changing routes is desirable but many times, due to the location of a home or office,
it is impossible. In most locations a driver has a 50-50 choice � to go right or left. The
pattern of abduction near the home is not coincidental: It is simply hard to change routes
near the home, therefore making it easy for a terrorist group to fix a time and location,
which in turn makes the terrorists' job much easier.
The best line of defense is unpredictability. It must be made difficult to pinpoint the
location of a potential target, though many people are not ready to accept this major change
of lifestyle. It is at this surveillance stage of abduction that an early warning system must
Early Warning System
An early warning system requires that a close watch be kept for abnormal activity near the
home and office. It is important to point out that it does not require much effort to be
security conscious. In fact, most people are security conscious and do not realize it. As an
example, when someone leaves his home in the morning, he could probably write a couple of
pages of notes concerning the activities around it, such as types of vehicles in the
neighborhood, children going to school, even new faces. In fact, most people can tell whether
they are late or early by what they see when they leave the house.
Careful questions can be raised by a businessman such as: Isn't that a strange car parked
across the street? The phone company must be working early this morning because they have a
van parked nearby. Or, as he drives down the street, he should notice unfamiliar people in
the area, an unfamiliar car, or a vehicle that just does not belong in the neighborhood. Most
businessmen who are potential kidnap victims live in affluent areas � which usually dictate
the type of vehicle that will be present in the area.
What has happened? A mental picture of what should be there and what should not be there has
been presented; and when an object or person comes into the picture that doesn't belong, a
signal is received that causes a question to be raised � what is it or he doing here? The key
to an effective surveillance awareness program is alertness. The philosophy should be adopted
that once is happenstance, twice is coincidence, and three times is enemy action. The level
of awareness must be raised to a point where
� Strange vehicles parked near the residence or place of employment are noticed and
reported to the authorities.
� People standing, walking, or sitting in cars near the residence or place of employment
� An individual can recognize that he is being followed. If he feels he is being followed,
he can simply drive around the block and notice if the suspected vehicle is still there.
An important point is to keep track of any unusual sightings. A small tape recorder can be
used to register any unusual activity. From the tape a log can be made describing any strange
vehicles. It should include:
� License number
� General condition
� Number of people in vehicle
And, if possible, a description of its occupants, such as their sex, age, size, hair color or
style, and ethnic background, should also be noted.
A reporting system is mandatory if chauffeurs are used and drivers are changed often: It
creates a useful information bank that the new driver can draw on. In addition, if the driver
is not sure he has seen the same thing twice, he can check back into the log to make certain.
If the log indicates a definite pattern is developing, then this pattern should be brought to
the attention of the local authorities. Any information discovered should be relayed to the
driver as quickly as possible. The driver should not be made to feel he is paranoid; in fact,
he should be told he is doing a good job. A good way of doing that is to get information
discovered back to him as soon as possible. What follows can be the best advice you can give
a driver. "If he feels something is wrong, it is better to suffer a little embarrassment in
the event you are wrong, than suffer the consequences if you are right!"
A surveillance awareness test program can be developed to check on the alertness of those
involved. Some simple methods to use are:
� Rent a car or van and park it near the residence. Then measure how long it takes before
the strange vehicle is noticed.
� Follow in a rent-a-car or another unfamiliar vehicle and again notice if the surveillance
� Plant strangers around the residence and measure that response time.
An ongoing test program is beneficial if the threat level is high enough.
Route planning should be premeditated � not haphazard. It is easy to develop a rather
scientific method of route planning. Using a map, lay out a number of different routes. If
possible, vary the routes near the home and office. Then assign each route a number, let's
say seven routes have been selected. Using the seven routes, make a table to assign each
route to a day, but leave out two routes.
On Monday route 1 is taken, Tuesday route 7, and so forth. Then you can develop a table of
random routes by changing the sequence of numbers and assigning them to a day. Example:
On week six you can change the sequence of routes by starting off at week three and taking
route 6 on Monday, route 3 on Tuesday, then on Wednesday move up to week two and take route 7,
Thursday route 1 and Friday route 5. What has been done is a set of dates have been blocked
off in the table. Example:
You can work any number of combinations � or add more routes. Although working with seven
numbers is not a complete random sequence, it is better than driving the same route constantly.
Knowledge of the Terrain
This simply means knowledge of the area. Most vehicle ambushes occur near the home; therefore
if an ambush does occur, there is a good chance it will happen in a terrain the victim knows
as well as the terrorists. Careful scrutiny of the area near the residence and the place of
employment can establish areas designated as danger zones. A danger zone is a location where
terrorists will find it easy to fix the time a person will be there. A danger zone can be an
intersection near your home that cannot be avoided, it can be an exit from an airport after
you have arrived on a scheduled flight, or an exit or entrance ramp to a highway. At the
danger zone area safe havens should be established. A safe haven is defined as an area that
will afford you some safety, an area that the attackers would be reluctant to follow you
into. They include:
� Police stations
� Fire stations
� Large shopping areas
� Military bases
It is important to know where the safe havens are and how to get there. In the event of an
ambush, there is no time to stop and ask for directions. The shortest possible route to safe
havens should be known. If the driver of the vehicle is not capable of computing the danger
zone areas, a member of the security department should develop a danger zone log. This log
can be reviewed by the driver on a periodic basis and can be updated if necessary.
Preparation for Ambushes
Now that the planning stages of an ambush have been discussed, let's talk about how the
actual ambush develops and the two driving tactics � moving and stationary � used to
In a moving ambush a car pulls along the victim's car and fires into the vehicle. In many
cases a second car is used to slow down the victim's vehicle in order to give the attackers
an easier target. The International Association of Chiefs of Police developed a set of
statistics from information provided by numerous attacks and from studies of the sites of the
attacks. These statistics indicate the following driver errors:
� The attack was completely unexpected. (Driver wasn't alert.) The driver suddenly found
himself "boxed in" and unable to take defensive or evasive action. (Driver was not alert,
observant, or driving defensively.)
� When the attack was launched, the driver attempted to veer to the right, away from the
attacking vehicle, and in doing so, trapped his vehicle against the curb line of parked cars.
This action gave the attackers more maneuvering room and enabled them to more effectively
bring their guns to bear on the target vehicle. (Driver not alert; driver reacted to induce
panic caused by the attackers' actions instead of acting defensively or offensively.)
� In one case, the driver attached no significance to or saw no danger in a vehicle full of
young men following him. He thought they were "just young smart alecks out for a joy ride."
(Driver not alert or trained.) In all cases the failure appears to be in one major area,
The stationary ambush seems to be the most popular. Basically a stationary ambush can be
described as an action carried out by the terrorists that will force the victim's
vehicle to a stop. They will try to stop the car in an area in which they have computed
firing angles, which more than likely are designed to disable the driver. In a stationary
ambush it is essential that the driver reverse direction and drive out of the firing area.
No matter what type of an ambush it is, the first few moments are critical. It is important
that some action be taken by the victim.
Anatomy of an Ambush
The Moro incident referred to at the beginning of this chapter is a perfect example of the
perfect ambush. It was so well planned and executed that one can only speculate whether the
incident could have been avoided at all. But some issues are nevertheless noteworthy.
� Predictability. The terrorists knew exactly where Moro was going to be. They had a
location and a time. Moro's security people gave him five possible routes to take. The
terrorists predicted the time and location with incredible accuracy.
� Surprise. The guards were not alert. Speculation is that perhaps they were relaxed
by the fact the car that cut in front of them had diplomatic plates. But, at the same time,
it is doubtful they ever saw the plates.
� Car. The car was not armored. In a country where vehicle ambushes are the national
pastime and everyone of importance is driving an armored car, it was foolhardy not to use one.
Similarly, the Schleyer assault also was well planned and executed. His abduction was
facilitated by the same factors: predictable schedule, even though Schleyer knew he was
a target; the follow-up car was caught completely off guard; and no armored car! These two
incidents bring up an excellent point about follow-up cars and bodyguards. If an individual
feels that the threat level requires a backup car with bodyguards � then the vehicle should
be a virtual gun-ship. The bodyguards in the car should be alert to possible dangers, and
their weapons should be on their laps ready to be used. It is foolish to have a back-up
car with armed men in the vehicle if the men take two minutes to react.
Using hindsight, one can speculate on how these events could have been prevented. The obvious
elements are (a) unpredictability, (b) alertness, and use of an armored car.
The subject of armored cars is confusing, though it appears that in most incidents an
armored car gives a driver those few seconds that can make the difference. The first
major obstacle concerning armored cars is determining if one is necessary. Answering this
question is difficult. But if there has been an incident that has prompted thought about
an armored car � then one is probably needed.
The next step is to determine the level of protection needed. Most car armorers talk in
terms of specifications established by underwriter laboratories (UL). Underwriter Labs has
established ratings for bulletproof material. These standards are established by testing
material at a close firing range (15 feet or less), firing at 12-inch-square samples.
Indicators are placed behind the samples to catch any fragments. The lower ratings
(I, II, III) must resist four shots placed three inches apart in a triangle in the center
of the material. At the highest level (IV), the. material must be able to resist one shot
from a high-powered rifle at the center of the sample. Materials are also tested for flying
fragments (spelling) and how they will perform in extreme temperatures. The levels of
No Level I
Level II�.357 magnum, carb. 9mm
Level III � Same as above, 44 magnum, 12 gauge, 30 carb.
Level IV � Same as above, 30.06 military ball
The level of armoring must be determined by the type of weapon you want to protect against.
An example is the UL's highest rating, level IV, which is 30.06 24" barrel soft grain, 2,400
ft/sec. A NATO weapon can be as high as 2,900 ft/ sec.
Reading the UL's standardized system, it becomes obvious that in order to establish the
degree of protection needed, one must know the type of weapons that may be used in an attack;
the method of the attack; and whether the attackers will be firing close or from a distance.
Studies indicate 30 percent of all kidnap teams used automatic weapons. Other studies show
that attacks are close range. Combining this data we can conclude that the level of protection
should be level IV or higher. It is in this stage of the purchase where the armorer can be of
great assistance. He will know as much about the levels of protection needed for certain
areas of the world as anyone.
Type of Vehicle
The type of vehicle must blend in with the existing cars in that particular country. Also,
there should be ample room in the car for four people. The car selected should:
� Blend into the vehicle environment.
� Be a four-door, which will allow comfort and ease of entering.
� Have a power unit � an engine size and gear ratio that will allow reasonable acceleration.
For example, in Italy, a Lincoln Town Sedan would not be the choice � Fiat would be the
likely consideration. The color of the car should blend in with the preferred colors in the
country. In most countries big, black cars signify importance.
Armored vehicles can be designed to
� Absorb the attack, take repeated hits, return fire, and call for help.
� Absorb the initial fire and break the ambush.
� A combination of the above.
The first of these armored vehicle designs is commonly used for the threat of assassination.
The cost of these cars is directly proportional to how long you want to absorb fire. Cars
armored to maximum ballistic levels are very expensive, running as high as $100,000. For a
car to absorb the initial burst and then drive out of the ambush requires characteristics:
(a) enough armor to absorb the initial fire, and (b) a design that remains maneuverable.
Whether additional armoring is needed in the engine department depends on where the
individual lives. If the car is used mostly in the city, then armoring the engine compartment
is usually not necessary. In the event of an ambush and radiator damage, the car need only go
a short distance to break the ambush. But if the car is used in the countryside and may have
to travel great distances to break free from the ambush, then engine compartment armoring is
Fuel Tank Armoring
Wrapping a fuel tank in ballistic fiberglass, Kevlar, or ballistic nylon will provide bullet
protection up to certain levels. If there is a penetration, there is a chance for explosion.
Aside from ignition caused by a bullet or an explosive device, there is the very real danger
of being rammed in the rear, which can cause an explosion. The aircraft industry has used
foam-filled tanks to reduce the danger of explosion. Foam normally is not applicable for the
vehicle field because of fuel displacement and the problem of degradation over a period of
time. Aero Tec Labs has come out with an excellent crushable bladder tank with internal foam
baffling, which appears to be superior to any other foam application in the security vehicle
Perhaps the finest protection available is the Explosive Anti-Explosion System. This
metallic (aluminum alloy foil) enclosure displaces but 1 percent of the fuel and has been
successfully tested by the Canadian and British military, using tracer rounds and plastic
explosives. Currently, a ballistic "Universal Tank" is being developed, stuffed with
Explosafe, which will be ideal for the security car industry.
The doors, windows, and rear of the passenger seat must be armored to the maximum threat
level. If grenades are a threat, the roof and floor must be armored, which increases the
price of the vehicle. The engine compartment is naturally armored. Armoring the battery,
engine compartment and radiator requires discussions with the armorer. There are two basic
philosophies concerning armoring � lightweight or heavyweight. The heavyweight people feel
that in the event of an all-out attack, the car will be forced to stop. The car should be
heavily armored so it can absorb as much punishment as possible. Adherents of the lightweight
philosophy claim that no matter how heavily the car is armored, it cannot hold up under
prolonged attack. Therefore, a lightweight, maneuverable car with a trained driver has a
better chance to break the ambush.
Lightweight versus heavyweight armor may become a bigger problem in the future. As our fuel
problems get worse, cars get smaller and lighter. The term lightweight armor may have to be
redefined. As of this time, the state-of-the-art service appears to be adding 700 to 1,000
pounds to the original weight of the car. The key is not the 700 to 1,000 pounds, but the
original weight of the car.
For instance, a 1979 Lincoln Town Coupe weighs 4,843 pounds � by adding 800 pounds of armor
you are increasing the weight by 16.5 percent. Change the car to a Ford Granada, which weighs
3,200 pounds, and add the same 800 pounds; the weight goes up by 25 percent � a dramatic
difference and an important measurement.
In breaking an ambush, the acceleration and handling capability of the vehicle are very
important, and the rate of acceleration will decrease the same percentage the amount of
weight increases. In other words, if the increase in weight is 25 percent, the acceleration
of the vehicle will decrease by 25 percent, assuming no modifications to the engine or gear
box. Table 1 gives you an idea of the percentage increase between various car and armor
The following considerations are necessary when installing the material:
* Retention of panels require the use of high-tensile captive bolts. The design
prevents them from becoming projectiles.
* Ballistic seals ensure that missiles cannot penetrate the vehicle at unusual
* Fabrication of certain materials can reduce the inherent ballistic properties.
Care must be exercised in the welding techniques, overlap construction, and
* Sealants used to prevent moisture from entering the layers of armor are sufficiently
resistant to contain edge stress. Particular care is given to hinges and locks.
Along with mobility, a good communication system is vital for survival. The principal's
vehicle and all security vehicles should be radio equipped. Select an excellent vehicle radio
that is not rugged and can be easily serviced. The vehicle antenna locations depend on the
environment. In many areas of the world it is common for an executive or an official sedan
to have a protruding antenna; however, when possible, an executive low-profile vehicle should
have a hidden antenna if reception and transmission are not affected.
A variety of antenna configurations are commercially available. Some can be hidden in the
side view mirrors, others wrap around the interior of the roof, or fit into the commercial
AM radio antenna. No matter what the unique configuration is, the prime consideration must be
reception and transmission quality, which must not be downgraded for a low-profile appearance.
Purchase and installation of radio gear should be assigned to a qualified communications
technician. Installation in the principal's vehicle should be mission designed. The microphone
should be within easy reach of both the driver and the occupant of the right-hand seat. If
the principal rides in the back seat, he too should have a microphone or at least an activations
system or a panic alarm � the latter in instances in which the driver and bodyguard are
incapacitated or so totally occupied they cannot utilize the communications system. If the
threat level is determined to be high, a danger zone-reporting system should be considered.
This is a system whereby the driver radios when he is going into a danger zone and then radios
when he is leaving the danger zone.
In the event the attackers gain entry into the vehicle and the driver or passenger cannot use
the radios, there should be a concealed microphone and microphone switch in the vehicle. This
will allow people at the other end of the radio transmission to hear what's going on in the car
without the attackers knowing.
Unfortunately, some armored car manufacturers and buyers have downgraded the importance of tire
protection. The fact is, vehicle mobility is the key to survival. If the tires are shot or
blown off, the vehicle is going nowhere, no matter how expensive the radials. The car needs a
device that will allow it to move at high speed for at least one or two miles out of the kill
zone of an urban ambush.
Although there are a number of runflat devices on the market, the buyer must be careful in the
selection of tire protection. With some devices present the possibility in a cornering
condition of a pulling away from the metal to expose the wheel rim flange to the road surface,
which can seriously interfere with steering and braking. Foam-filled tires and tires with rigid
sidewalls are not the answer, especially in a soft-soil condition. Foam presents a weight
problem in terms of unsprung weight, while rigid sidewalls present problems if sharp, high-speed
evasive maneuvers are attempted.
The Hutchinson V.P. No Flat tire core is a form of tire protection that is fairly expensive,
restricted to Michelin tires, and of good ballistic protection capabilities. The Patecell
Safety Wheel (a fairly expensive plastic runflat device) claims a 50 mph speed for 50 miles
after the tires have been shot out. This would be excellent for a rural ambush, but urban
incidents call for 70 to 90 mph speeds over a short dash of a half mile or until out of line
or site of fire. The Patecell should be able to accomplish that requirement.
A device that is in wide use in security vehicles throughout the world is the Lindley
Saftiwheel. The original wheel has saved lives, including the life of one of the most prominent
leaders of the twentieth century. Because the original wheel was difficult to install, a new
Safti-Wheel will soon be in production, which eliminates installation difficulties, is superior
all around, and is cost effective. Cost- and performance-wise, the new Safti-Wheel may well be
the finest device on the market if it passes further ballistic and driving tests.
Goodyear has announced a new flat-proof radial whose walls are three times thicker than the
normal tire; however, at the time of this writing no published ballistic tests are available.
There is some debate as to the handling capabilities in severe vehicle movements at high speed,
such as sudden sharp turns, especially in soft sand or mud, due to the rigid sidewalls. If the
tire passes intensive ballistic testing and handles well, it will be a boon to the security
Others of note are a protection package offered by Dunlop and the Tyron Safety Band out of the
United Kingdom, which is available for most makes of cars.
Accessories can also be confusing. They vary from car to car and what is standard equipment on
one car is an additional accessory on others. Accessories come in several categories:
* Functional additions
* Power options
One way of breaking accessories down into these categories follows. There is room for dispute
in many of these selections.
Tilt steering wheel
Electric window defogger
Heavy-Duty Battery. Better to handle the strain from the multitude of electrical equipment on
cars and a necessity for anyone living in a cold climate.
Heavy-Duty Radiator. Increases the engine's cooling capacity. Heat is what destroys engines.
Heavy-Duty Suspension. Will help eliminate body roll but will give a slightly harsher ride.
It will make for a better-handling vehicle.
Remote side control mirrors
Protective side molding
Six-way power seats
Electric door locks
Power trunk (from the glove box)
Most people in the automotive industry feel that the following list of equipment should be
placed into the basic categories listed above.
1. Trauma kit. Doctors can develop a package designed for treating gunshot wounds, burns,
and heart failure. Its basic purpose is to keep someone alive until they can get to a hospital.
The trauma kit should not be kept in the trunk; it should be inside the vehicle ready for use.
2. Tool kit in the trunk. In the event of a kidnapping, someone may get stuffed in the trunk.
A simple tool kit can get him out. Or you can make a switch that opens the trunk from the
3. Mirrors. Good rear and side view mirrors should be installed on the car. They should be
installed in a manner so the driver does not have to move his head to look to the rear, and he
should have good vision to the rear. Good mirrors are defined as mirrors that do not distort
the actual distance of the object. Many mirrors make objects seem further away than they really
4. Public address system. The driver and occupants should be able to talk to someone outside
the car without opening the doors. Also, the driver does not have to drive up to someone to
talk to him; they can stay a safe distance away and communicate.
5. Optics. Be sure there is little or no distortion through the windshield. When purchasing
a car the ambient temperature of the environment is important. If the window is not designed
properly, it can distort the view badly. The old bullet-resistant glass is ineffective against
high-powered weapons and repeated hits.
Surprise is essential to the success of any terrorist assault or abduction. It is obvious,
however, that any such operation requires extensive previous reconnaissance and surveillance;
and it is precisely at this stage that an attack can, and must, be thwarted. The potential
kidnap victim must develop countersurveillance techniques and preventive measures that can
reduce the possibilities of attack. Accordingly, while the victim must learn to recognize a
developing ambush, he must also know how to react to and evade an abduction attempt. To this
end, the potential victim must analyze beforehand the ingredients necessary for a successful
ambush and develop an awareness program to protect against them.
These efforts include route planning, the designation of both danger zones and safe havens,
and the realization that, once an assault begins, the vehicle he is traveling in must never
stop. First priority is fleeing the attack scene as fast as possible. In this regard, a
potential victim must be assured that his automobile is armored and thus strong enough to
withstand a fusilade of machine-gun fire and capable of withstanding damage to the engine and
tires. The final preventive element is skilled defensive and, when need be, offensive driving �
something imparted by actual experience.